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EVANS v. ABNEY: REVERTING TO SEGREGATION
By DAVID S. BOGEN*
Last term the Supreme Court approved state court enforcement
of a racially restrictive condition for the first time since its decision
prohibiting enforcement of such a condition in Shelley v. Kraemer.'
The Court held in Evans v. Abney2 that the Georgia Supreme Court
could find that the trustees' constitutional inability to comply with a
racial restriction in a will' caused the trust property to revert to the
testator's heirs. This suggests that Shelley and its progeny in estate
and trust law should be reexamined to ascertain whether the Court
has here acted consistently with the principles of those cases, departed
from those principles, or simply misapplied them.
A brief chronology of the background to the Court's decision
in Abney is necessary. In 1911, Augustus 0. Bacon devised a tract
of land to the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia, for the
purpose of providing a park for white people only. After several years
of operating the park on a segregated basis, the city-appointed board
of trustees began admitting Negroes on the theory that maintaining a
segregated public facility was constitutionally impermissible. Several
of the trustees then brought suit against Macon asking that the city
be removed as trustee and that the court appoint new trustees to
whom title would then be transferred. Several Negroes intervened,
urging that the court not appoint new trustees, while several of Bacon's
heirs intervened, asking for the reversion of the park in the event
that the court did not appoint new trustees. The city then resigned
its trusteeship, and the court appointed three new trustees. The
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed this decree.'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the public char-
acter of this park requires that it be treated as a public institution
subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless
of who now has title under state law."5 On remand, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that, regardless of the identity of the trustees,
the park must now be operated on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e.,
in a manner contrary to the specific purpose of Bacon's will.' The
case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the validity
of the heirs' contentions as to the reversion of the property. The trial
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1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The closest the Court came to upholding a racial cove-
nant was its affirmance by an equally divided Court of the use by a party to a
contract of a racial covenant in the contract as a defense to an action on the contract.Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). But the Court
then granted a rehearing, vacated the affirmance and dismissed the petition for cer-
tiorari as improvidently granted. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
2. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
3. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
4. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
5. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).6. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966). The court stated,
"Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the sole purpose for which the
trust was created has become impossible of accomplishment and has been terminated."
148 S.E.2d at 330.
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court held that operation of the cy pres doctrine was barred because
no general charitable intent could be discerned from the testator's
will. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed,7 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.'
The Shelley Court had found that state enforcement of a private
agreement to discriminate was a denial by the state of equal protec-
tion of the laws although the bias was initiated by a private person
and the state was merely applying its racially neutral law that private
agreements will be enforced by the court. This finding of state re-
sponsibility for discrimination was the forerunner of more than two
decades of decisions which found sufficient state involvement in dis-
crimination to call for application of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.' The Court in Abney did not hold that the
state was not responsible for discrimination resulting from enforce-
ment of the reversion, but rather that no discrimination resulted.
Nevertheless, the Abney opinion contains several references empha-
sizing the fact that the state law is racially neutral and that the dis-
criminatory result is actually determined by the private bias of an
individual long dead.'" This might suggest that the state is not deny-
ing equal protection when it enforces a discriminatory provision in
a will. However, analysis of Shelley demonstrates that, if the Abney
Court had found discrimination to result from enforcement of the
reversion, the Court would have had to find it forbidden or else
repudiate Shelley.
I. THEORIES OF "STATE ACTION" FROM Shelley
In Shelley v. Kraemer," property owners subject to a restrictive
racial covenant brought an action to restrain Shelley, a Negro, from
taking possession of property which he had purchased in violation
of the covenant. The Court held that enforcement of such a covenant
by the state court would be state action and that such state action
denied Mr. Shelley the equal protection of the laws. Ascertaining
precisely why such enforcement is state denial of equal protection has
proved to be an elusive task for commentators.' 2 At least five theories
7. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
8. Evans v. Abney, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
9. E.g., Hunter v. Ericson, 393 U.S. 285 (1969); Evans v. Newton, 282 U.S. 296(1966) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; Pennsylvania
v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
10. "Surely the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated where, as here, a state
court operating in its judicial capacity fairly applies its normal principles of construc-
tion to determine the testator's true intent in establishing a charitable trust and then
reaches a conclusion with regard to that intent which, because of the operation of
neutral and non-discriminatory state trust laws, effectively denies everyone, whites as
well as Negroes, the benefits of the trust." 396 U.S. at 446. "The Baconsfield trust
'failed' under that law not because of any belief on the part of any living person that
whites and Negroes might not enjoy being together but, rather, because Senator
Bacon who died many years ago intended that the park remain forever for the ex-
clusive use of white people." Id. at 447.
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer, Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.473 (1962) ; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLtM. L. REv. 1083 (1960) ;
Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Cove-
nant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949); Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth
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have been advanced. But under any of these theories, the Court could
not enforce a provision in a will which required a trustee or a bene-
ficiary to discriminate.
A. Statutory Violation
On one reading, Shelley did not involve state action problems. It
was simply a case of violation of a federal statute. Justice Black,joined by Justices Harlan and White, dissenting in Bell v. Maryland,"
characterized Shelley as follows:
It seems pretty clear that the reason judicial enforcement of the
restrictive covenants in Shelley was deemed state action was not
merely the fact that a state court had acted, but rather that it
had acted "to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or
color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which peti-
tioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the
grantors are willing to sell." In other words, this Court held
that state enforcement of the covenants had the effect of denying
to the parties their federally guaranteed right to own, occupy,
enjoy, and use their property without regard to race or color. 4
In other words, enforcement of the restrictive covenant violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
If the Court were to adopt such an interpretation of Shelley, it
would still have to decide whether allowance of a reversion results
in discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave all citizens the
same right as white citizens to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey" property.' 5 In Jones v. Mayer,'6 the Court held that refusal
of a private developer to sell to a Negro was a denial to the Negro
of his right to purchase property. Similarly, if the inheritance of the
park is limited to white citizens as a class, it may be argued that the
black citizen does not enjoy the same right to inherit as the white
citizen.
But if Shelley was really just a case of enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the form of the Shelley opinion is unfathomable.
The Civil Rights Act is mentioned only as an illustration of the prop-
osition that "among the civil rights intended to be protected from
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the
rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property."'" Assuming
that the Act applied to enforcement of a restrictive covenant, the
Amendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable
Trusts, 56 GEO. L.J. 272 (1967) ; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity:
4 Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
13. 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
14. Id. at 330 (citations omitted). At a time when Congress has exercised a
good deal of power to attack racial problems, the Court may be tempted to abdicate
the role it has been playing and thrust the burden for securing racial equality onto
Congress.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Shelley v. Kraemer, 3.34 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
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Court would have to justify the constitutionality of the Act. If the
Act is justified under the thirteenth amendment, 8 the emphasis in the
Shelley opinion on state action is totally irrelevant. If the Act is
justified under the fourteenth amendment, the Shelley opinion should
have focused on how the theory of state action justified the Act.
Instead of pointing to violation of a constitutional statute, the Court
stated at several points that the state denied equal protection of the
laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Although it is pos-
sible for the Court to construe the holding in Shelley in a way totally
at odds with the form which the opinion took, it is not likely that a
majority of the Court will do so in the future.20
B. Public Function
Another reading of Shelley is that restrictive covenants are a
form of private zoning, that zoning is a function of the state and that
the state is responsible if it permits private persons to exercise its
functions. 2' Thus, Justice Douglas has said, "Leaving the zoning
function to groups which practice discrimination and are licensed by
the states constitutes state action in the narrowest sense in which
Shelley can be construed. ' '2
Using the public function rationale, the enforcement of the re-
version in Abney might be considered state action. Charitable be-
quests serve a public function, especially where such money is to be
used for a public park. The state gives special benefits to charitable
trusts including tax exemptions and exemption from the rule against
perpetuities. Justice Douglas used this rationale as an alternative basis
for finding that the trustees could not discriminate in the operation
of the park in Evans v. Newton. "Mass recreation through the use
of public parks is plainly in the public domain . . . ; and state courts
that aid private parties to perform that public function on a segre-
gated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment."2 3  Thus, if the court enforcement of the re-
version would assist the trustee in discriminating in the operation
of the park, such enforcement should be proscribed.
Justice Douglas, however, carefully avoided committing himself
to this narrow reading of the Shelley case. This narrow public func-
tion reasoning was used in the briefs in Shelley, but the opinion does
not suggest that the Court accepted the argument.
18. The Act was in fact found constitutional on the basis of the thirteenth amend-
ment in Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19. "We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements
in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and
that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 20 (1948). "Upon full consideration, we have concluded that in these cases
the States have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 23.
20. Even Justice Black in Abney indicates that he gives Shelley a broader reading.
See text accompanying note 25 infra.
21. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1083 (1960).
22. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384-85 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
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C. All Inclusive
A third reading of Shelley relies on the fact that the state in
enforcing the covenant recognized a right to discriminate. Thus, it
may be argued that, in asserting a right to treat people unequally,
the state is failing to afford equal protection of its laws. "[A]ny
court action which enforces or facilitates private discrimination is
unlawful state activity if the state itself could not have constitutionally
required or encouraged the discrimination in question. ' 24 This analy-
sis is consistent with Justice Black's reference in Abney to Shelley as
holding "unconstitutional state judicial action which had affirma-
tively enforced a private scheme of discrimination against Negroes."25
It also finds support in the statements of Justice Douglas, joined
by Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell v. Maryland,6 which in-
volved the conviction of restaurant sit-in demonstrators for trespass:
"Why should we refuse to let state courts enforce apartheid in resi-
dential areas of our cities but let state courts enforce apartheid in
restaurants? If a court decree is state action in one case, it is in the
other."' 27  It turns the attention of the Court to other principles for
limiting the reach of the fourteenth amendment - to its collision
with other constitutional guarantees 2  or to a distinction between
public life and private life.29 Under this theory of Shelley and state
action, the enforcement of the reverter in Abnev would be state
action and the only remaining question would be whether such action
effected any discrimination.
If this theory of state action were the basis for the Shelley Court's
decision, a simple cite to Shelley would have disposed of many of the
civil rights cases which proved to be extraordinarily difficult for the
Court." The failure to do so suggests that the Court fears such an
expansive principle, and there is no suggestion in the decisions of the
Court that they intend to apply Shelley in such a fashion in the near
future.
D. No Enforcement of Racial Restriction
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Abney, said "Shelley v. Kraemer
. . . stands at least for the proposition that where parties of different
races are willing to deal with one another a state court cannot keep
them from doing so by enforcing a privately authored racial restric-
tion."'" This led Justice Brennan to conclude that the Court could
24. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look
at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEO. L.J. 272, 305 (1967).
25. 396 U.S. at 445.
26. 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (concurring opinion).
27. Id. at 259.
28. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer, Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (1962).
29. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Propo-
sition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967). While a resolution of the state action issue
is unnecessary for purposes of examining the effects of the Abney decision, it may be
appropriate to note here that the approach of Professor Black commends itself to
this author.
30. E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
31. 396 U.S. at 456.
[VOL. XXX
REVERTING To SEGREGATION
not enforce the reversion. Under this theory the fact that no dis-
crimination resulted would be irrelevant. The majority in Abney
rejected Justice Brennan's interpretation since they based their opinion
on a finding of no discrimination and distinguished Shelley as in-
volving discrimination.
E. Forcing Third Person to Discriminate
Professor Pollak has put forth a rationale similar to, but more
limited than, the one given by Justice Brennan. He argues that
the state is denying equal protection only when it assists private
persons in their attempt to force others to act in a manner which
the state could not itself require.3 2 This reading is consistent with
Justice Black's statements in Abney quoted earlier 3 and with his
discussion in Bell distinguishing Shelley from discrimination by a
store owner: "The property owner may, in the absence of a valid
statute forbidding it, sell his property to whom he pleases and admit
to that property whom he will; so long as both parties are willing
parties, then the principles stated in Buchanan and Shelley protect
this right.""4  The incompatability of the statutory interpretation
theory of Justice Black3" and the public function theory of Justice
Douglas36 with the form of the Shelley opinion and the apparent re-
jection by the Court of the broader state action theories of Professor
Black 7 and Justice Brennan3 8 make it likely that Professor Pollak's
view would command the broadest support on the Court today.
It may be argued that this theory makes Shelley entirely in-
applicable to trusts because the trustee is not an independent indi-
vidual but a mere extension of the settlor and is already charged with
the duty to comply with the settlor's wishes as contained in the trust
instrument.3 9 This seems to overlook the trustee's discretion. If the
trust instrument does not specifically limit his administration of the
trust, he may administer it in a way in which the testator would
surely never have done. Although the trustee gains his power over
the trust res from the trust instrument and cannot act in violation
of it (except insofar as a particular restriction may be unlawful), the
grantee of land in Shelley also obtains possession by means of an in-
strument which may limit what use he can make of the property. It
is true that the grantee has a selfish interest in the property which
the trustee does not have and which would cause him to maximize
his own freedom to use or dispose of the property in ways which may
be contrary to the desires of the grantor. But this distinction does
not seem relevant to the problem of whether the person (grantee or
32. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
33. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
34. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
35. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
38. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
39. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look as
Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967).
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trustee) can be compelled by the settlor to discriminate in the use
of the property. Thus, under Professor Pollak's theory of Shelley v.
Kraemer, the state cannot force a trustee to discriminate against his
will in the administration of the trust.40
Thus, under any theory of Shelley, the Court was required to
determine whether enforcement of the reverter resulted in discrimi-
nation. The finding that no discrimination resulted enabled the Court
to avoid discussing the various theories of state action which might
be argued. But it is important to note that nothing in Abney sug-
gests that a state can enforce a provision of a will which does dis-
criminate.
I. ESTATES AND TRUSTS PROGENY OF Shelley
An understanding of the Court's decision that no discrimination
occurred as a result of the enforcement of the reversion requires a
review of the case law involving trustees under a will requiring racial
discrimination.
A. Enforcement of Requirement of Discrimination
In recent cases where the administrator or trustee has asked a
court for a decision that he is not obligated to abide by a racial re-
striction, the court has applied the doctrine of cy pres to free him
from the condition.4' These courts have noted that the main intent
of the testator was to aid a functioning institution and that, due to
the changing nature of our society, including the non-discrimination
requirements attached to federal grants, it is impossible or highly
impractical to attempt to achieve the settlor's main goal without vio-
lating his subsidiary racially restrictive condition. In order to effectu-
ate the primary desire of the settlor, therefore, it is necessary to
eliminate the racial condition.
Cy pres is not a resolution for all racially restrictive conditions,
however. Evans v. Abney 2 is a demonstration that courts, perhaps
particularly in the South (either because of the prejudice of the court
or a frank recognition of the prejudice of the settlor), may find that
the racial restriction is inextricably bound to the settlor's primary
intent. Even in the North, courts may find that the settlor would
rather have the gift fail than be used by an integrated group.43
One reason for the appeal which the doctrine of cy pres seems to
have in state courts is that it avoids a difficult constitutional question.
40. See Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967);Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). The
extension of this theory into trust law need not invalidate the religious trust. The
theory may only apply to equal protection. See Black, supra note 29. Furthermore,
permitting trusts for other charitable purposes may make denial of enforcement of such
a trust an infringement on free exercise. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
41. E.g., Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College, 461 P.2d
28 (Colo. 1969) ; Bank of Delaware v. Buxton, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969);
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
42. 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
43. La Fond v. Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959).
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A small group of cases has taken another approach. Citing Shelley,
they state that a court cannot constitutionally compel a trustee to
follow a racially discriminatory condition. In the first of these cases,
after finding that Tulane was a private university and could not be
compelled to integrate, the federal district court in Louisiana held
that the trustees could accept Negro students despite a racial restric-
tion in the original grant of money from Paul Tulane. "Indubitably
the Tulane Board is free to act as it wishes since neither this nor
any other court may exercise its power to enforce racial restrictions
in private covenants."" However, there was no possibility of re-
version in that case because the heirs of Paul Tulane expressly waived
their rights to enforce the racial restriction.
In another case the trustee under a will in California was un-
willing to abide by the discriminatory provisions of the will. A Cali-
fornia superior court found that it was without power to substitute
a new trustee who would obey the restriction:
If the Court were to appoint some fiduciary other than that
designated by Mrs. Walker - some trustee who would be will-
ing to administer the trust with the discriminatory provisions
intact - the Court would be lending its hand in aid of discrimi-
nation. Mrs. Walker was constitutionally free, as a private in-
dividual to discriminate as she did, but the Court is not ...
State courts cannot promote or give effect to private contracts
that deny equal protection of the laws.4"
Finally, Sweet Briar Institute successfully sought an injunction
against state officials to prevent them from enforcing a racial restric-
tion in a testamentary disposition. Under Virginia statutes state of-
ficials have a right to bring suit to require trustees to conform to the
conditions of their trust. The federal district court granted an injunc-
tion against such a suit, saying the "state cannot require compliance
with the testamentary restriction because that would constitute state
action barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. '46
In none of these cases was the state court asked by a private
person to enforce the terms of the trust. In the first, the heirs waived
enforcement; in the second, the case concerned substitution of trus-
tees rather than an order directed at the existing trustee; and, in the
third, the injunction prevented the state from enforcing the trust sua
sponte. Nevertheless, these distinctions were not emphasized in the
opinions. Instead, the courts reasoned that Shelley prevented any
court from enforcing such a restriction. Nothing in Abney detracts
from this reasoning. The state is surely more involved in the denial
44. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D.
La. 1962).
45. In re Estate of Ruth Snively Walker, No. 70195 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa
Barbara County, Apr. 23, 1965), reprinted in Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 9,
11-12, Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
and cited in Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look
at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 Go. L.J. 272, 303 n.166
(1967).
46. Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967).
19701
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of equal protection when it orders a trustee to discriminate than when
it says that the trustee cannot discriminate and terminates the trust.
For many cases the inability of the state to order the trustee
to act on a discriminatory basis in accordance with the testator's will
effectively removes the discrimination in the gift. A breach of trust
by the trustee does not cause a reversion unless there is a condition
subsequent. The only remedy for such a breach is a suit to enforce
the terms of the trust; and, where, as here, such a suit cannot be
maintained, there is no remedy for breach of trust.
B. Enforcement of Reversion for Failure to Discriminate
Nevertheless, in many cases of which Abney is an example,
there will be a condition subsequent. Again, discrimination could be
avoided by the use of cy pres. But where the intent of the testator
is clear that integration should cause the gift to fail, the court is
faced with a difficult problem. In Shelley and the other cases just
discussed, enforcement of the covenant would have resulted in dis-
crimination in the case before the court. Where a reverter is enforced,
however, it is obvious that there is no discrimination in the case be-
fore the court. If there were discrimination, there would be no
reversion.
In Barrows v. Jackson,47 suit was brought for damages against the
seller of property for violating a restrictive covenant. No attempt
was made to dispossess the Negro who had purchased the land.
Enforcement of the covenant would not cause discrimination in the
case before the Court since there would have been no case unless
the Negro had been able to purchase and retain possession of the
property. Thus, Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting, argued:
The plain, admitted fact that there is no identifiable non-caucasian
before this Court who will be denied any right to buy, occupy
or otherwise enjoy the properties involved in this lawsuit, or
any other particular properties, is decisive to me. It means that
the constitutional defect, present in the Shelley case, is removed
from this case. 48
But the majority responded that, whatever the result in the case
before the Court, the establishment of the principle that the Court
will give damages for breach of a racially restrictive covenant would
coerce others into obeying such a covenant and thus deprive Negroes
of the opportunity to purchase property.
If a state court awards damages for breach of restrictive
covenant, a prospective seller of restricted land will either refuse
to sell to non-caucasians or else will require non-caucasians to
pay a higher price to meet the damages which the seller may
incur. Solely because of their race, non-caucasians will be
unable to purchase, own, and enjoy property on the same terms
47. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
48. Id. at 262 (dissenting opinion).
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as caucasians. Denial of this right by state action deprives such
non-caucasions, unidentified but identifiable, of equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Similarly, not only would enforcement of a racial restriction of
a trust force the trustee to discriminate, but enforcement of a re-
versionary interest for breach of the restriction would compel the
trustee to discriminate in order to maintain the trust. Thus, where
enforcement of the reversionary interest compels the trustee to dis-
criminate, such enforcement would seem to be prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment.
Evans v. Abney presents the rather unique situation where the
trustee is prohibited by the Constitution from complying with the
terms of the trust even if he so desires. If the limits of state action
are defined as broadly as suggested by Professors Black,50 Henkin, 1
Ming,52 and Nelkin,53 all trustees would be so prohibited and Abney
would take on additional significance. Abney relies on the fact that
the trustee is legally bound not to discriminate to support its con-
clusion that acknowledgment of the reversion for failure to discrimi-
nate does not result in discrimination. "Here the effect of the Georgia
decision eliminated all discrimination against Negroes in the park
by eliminating the park itself, and the termination of the park was
a loss shared equally by the White and Negro citizens of Macon since
both races would have enjoyed a constitutional right of equal access
to the park's facilities had it continued." '54
Abney leads to the anamolous position that trustees who wish
to administer a trust in a non-discriminatory manner can do so,
unless they are required by law to do so, in which case they cannot.
This position depends on acceptance of the argument that only where
the state does not require integration does the state, by potential
enforcement of the reverter, compel the trustee to discriminate. But
closer analysis reveals that by its decision in Abney the Court is per-
mitting the state to put pressure on the trustee to discriminate.
While no discrimination may be apparent in the reversion to
the heirs in Abney, the principle of that decision may lead other
trustees to discriminate. The natural tendency of any trustee is to
attempt to fulfill the trust and to maintain his position as trustee. He
may receive remuneration for acting as trustee; he may enjoy the
power which he exerts as trustee; or he may simply desire to assure
that the beneficiaries receive the testator's largesse. Whatever his
reason or combination of reasons for accepting a position as trustee,
they will be frustrated if the trust fails. A trustee who might wish
to administer the trust in a non-discriminatory fashion will be less
49. Id. at 254.
50. Black, supra note 29.
51. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer, Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473 (1962).
52. Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 203 (1949).
53. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look at
Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967).
54. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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likely to do so if he knows that as a result the trust will fail, he will
lose his position, and the charitable beneficiary will lose all benefit.
After Abney the trustee realizes that he will lose his position as
trustee and the trust res will revert to the heirs if he fails to discrimi-
nate. While the trust res may eventually revert anyway if the trustee
is ordered to integrate by the Court as in Evans v. Newton, the
trustee may delay such a reversion by an initial decision to adminis-
ter the trust in accordance with the racial restriction.
Not only does the allowance of the reversion encourage the
trustee to discriminate initially in order to delay loss of the trust res,
it may encourage him to discriminate in order to prevent ever losing
the res. The heirs may agree with the settlor's desire to racially re-
strict use of the res. Even if they wished to cause a reversion, they
may not have standing to force the trustee to integrate. The right
they would be asserting would not be theirs. While the heirs would
have no standing to challenge the segregated trust, the Negro has no
interest. As a result of Abney, the Negro will spend large amounts
of money in a lawsuit without obtaining any tangible benefit of access.
Negroes might sue in the hope that the Court will apply cy pres,
but where the settlor has spelled out his intent to encourage segrega-
tion that hope will be dim. It will be especially faint in areas of the
deep South where racial conditions are most likely to be found. Some
individual Negroes might bring suits to prevent whites from enjoy-
ing a benefit which Negroes can never get; but the number of in-
dividuals whose sense of outrage overcomes the limitations of their
pocketbook, the natural hostility of the whites who lose the benefit,
and the lack of any tangible benefit for the plaintiff will be small
indeed. Only an organization like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Inc. would be able to mount a sustained attack against segregation
achieved by testamentary provisions. Thus, if discrimination result-
ing from this decision is to be eliminated, the Legal Defense Fund
would have to discover all the instances of such trusts, expend
large portions of its budget to bring suits (assuming it has the man-
power to deal with violations of the fourteenth amendment on an in-
dividual basis) which avert segregation without obtaining any tangi-
ble benefit for the plaintiffs. Further, the settlor may set aside a
much smaller portion of his estate for the use of Negroes as a correla-
tive park so that victory in a suit would actually deprive the Negro
of a benefit he already had. Throughout the history of the civil rights
movement, civil rights organizations have sought to obtain equal
benefits and advantages. To premise a constitutional decision on the
assumption that they will press just as eagerly to deprive whites of
benefits which they cannot obtain for themselves seems both unwise
and improper.
Finally, the effect of this case is to encourage settlors to pro-
mote segregation. The Court has informed them that they have
a right to make a reversion based on failure of the trustee to dis-
criminate. Thus, the settlor can leave his property for use by the
government on a segregated basis with the assurance that, should
anyone challenge this use, the property will not be lost but returned
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to the settlor's heirs or the grantees of the reversionary interest. Of
course, whenever the state recognizes the right of an individual to
discriminate, it is, in a sense, encouraging such discrimination. Here,
however, the encouragement is of a much greater character. The
individual is not only encouraged to discriminate, but is also en-
couraged to use the power of the state to put pressure on another
individual to discriminate.
III. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS
There are a number of problems with a decision that would in-
validate the reversion under the fourteenth amendment. It results in
a deliberate violation of the settlor's intent and a use of the money
for further integration which, it is assumed, would be abhorrent to
the testator. It has been argued that removal of class limits merely
adds beneficiaries to a class intended to be benefited and thus is not
a serious perversion of the testator's interest.5" This ignores the pos-
sibility that the sole intent of the settlor may have been to further
separation of the races, so that merely expanding the class of bene-
ficiaries results in total frustration of the settlor's intent. But why
should property be disposed of in accordance with the settlor's intent?
It is only a policy of state law which permits such transmission of
property, and any provision which is contrary to state policy may
be struck.5" It does not seem inappropriate that one risk of the settlor
is loss of control of his money when he attempts to violate basic
policies of the state.
A practical objection to voiding the reversion is that it would
discourage charitable gifts, but discouraging segregated gifts for public
use would seem a credit rather than a debit in terms of public policy.
A more realistic fear might be that it would deter gifts for the benefit
of minority groups. Since it is likely that more gifts and trusts are
now being established for minority groups than for whites only, a deci-
sion voiding reversions in gifts with racial classifications might, by de-
terring such gifts, hurt more than it helps the Negro. But a prohibition
of favoritism to whites does not necessarily require invalidation of
trusts to benefit minority groups;" a rational basis exists for dis-
tinguishing between gifts to minority groups and to the white
majority, in that as long as these minority groups continue to hold
an inferior position in our society, gifts to them can only operate to
equalize their position with that of the white majority. When and if
this rational basis disappears, the reasoning of this article provides
a basis for invalidating the minority group limitation despite the
wholly compensatory purpose of the testator.
The Court may have considered, however, that the harmful
effects of allowing the reversion here were minimal and outweighed
55. Nelkin, supra note 53, at 300; Power, The Racially Discriminatory Charitable
Trust: A Suggested Treatment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 478, 495-96 (1965).
56. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957).
57. See Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RuTGaaas L. REv. 65(1969) ; Power, supra note 55. at 494.
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by the drawbacks in .a decision denying reversion. After all, there are
probably very few gifts today of significant amounts which are sub-ject to racial restrictions. If a large movement developed to avoid
integriation by making such gifts, assuredly civil rights groups would
challenge the bequests. In any event, a refusal by the federal gov-
ernment to treat such gifts. as charitable and deductible would serve
in large measure to deter the imposition of racial restrictions. In fact,
for the state or federal government to grant the benefit of a tax deduc-
tion to gifts with a racially discriminatory condition would raise serious
constitutional issues under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.5" I
would strike the balance the other way. State pressure to discrimi-
nate should always be prohibited.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Abney clearly states that the reversion is permissible
because there was no discrimination, the opinion does not fully ex-
plain why there was no discrimination. It might be argued that the
Court's references to the loss of the park by both blacks and whites
show that no discrimination existed in the case before the court.
"Here the effect of the Georgia decision eliminated all discrimination
against Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself."59 But,
if court enforcement of a principle which causes discrimination in
other cases is not itself impermissible, the Court is overruling the
principle of Barrows v. Jackson sub silentio. There is no reference
to Barrows in the opinion, and the Court proffers no reason for
establishing any principle that would foster segregation.
The Court might mean that no discrimination results where the
pressure to discriminate which the reversion puts on the trustee is bal-
anced by a constitutional command not to discriminate. "[T]he termi-
nation of the park was a loss, shared equally by the White and Negro
citizens of Macon since both races would have enjoyed a constitu-
tional right of equal access to the park's facilities had it continued"" 0
The reversion on its face requires the trustee to segregate, but pre-
sumably he will not because he is constitutionally prohibited. Since
it is' constitutionally impossible to fulfill the trust, the trust is void.
The opposing forces balance out; so the result is the same as if the
testator never made a charitable gift, but left the property directly
to his. heirs. The difficulty with this theory is its departure from
reality. The charitable gift will have an effect until the case is brought
to court. If the charitable trust never took effect, the reasoning might
be appropriate. But the probate court will usually not inquire into
the validity of the trust, 1 and so the trust will be operative until
objection is made to it. Consequently, the reversion will affect the
operation of the trust even if discrimination violates the Constitution.
Finally, the Court may here be engaged in a balancing process,
determining that the discrimination in this case is too remote and
58. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
59. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435. 445 (1970).
60. Id. at 445.
61. State ex rel. Church v: Warren, 28 Md. 338 (1868).
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insubstantial in effect for the Court to upset basic estate law by using
a testator's property to accomplish a purpose abhorrent to him. The
Court did not explicitly take a balancing approach, perhaps from
fear that private citizens and lower courts would take a cue that
discrimination may be tolerated. Yet the failure to expressly acknowl-
edge the balancing done makes it possible that lower courts will adopt
one of the two other approaches to the Court's opinion discussed
above.
Although Abney may mark a limit on judicial action under the
fourteenth amendment to prevent discrimination, it need not signal a
general retreat. It may be an aberration caused by the convergence
of concerns over individual control of property (that it not be used
to defeat the intentions of the property owner) with the indirectness
of the pressure to discriminate, whose force is greatly reduced both
by the law forbidding that same discrimination and by possible penal-
ties in the form of loss of charitable deductions. It is important,
therefore, that lower courts recognize the exceptional nature of the
circumstances in Abney; and it would be helpful to that end if the
Court in future cases would emphasize the limited nature of the Abney
holding and the combination of factors which brought it about.
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